Prevention and Complementarity in the International Criminal Court: A Positive Approach by Marshall, Katharine A.
Human Rights Brief
Volume 17 | Issue 2 Article 4
2010
Prevention and Complementarity in the
International Criminal Court: A Positive Approach
Katharine A. Marshall
American University Washington College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief
Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons,
International Law Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Human Rights Brief by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marshall, Katharine A. "Prevention and Complementarity in the International Criminal Court: A Positive Approach." Human Rights
Brief 17, no.2 (2010):21-26.
21
introDuCtion
Since its creation, the International Criminal Court (ICC or Court) has been at the heart of some of the oldest and most complex debates in international law — debates 
over practical issues like enforcement and state sovereignty 
and questions of ideology such as the relative values of peace 
and justice. A crucial question throughout all of this has been 
prevention: the ICC’s ability to end impunity and prevent future 
atrocities. The Court’s supporters have consistently emphasized 
its potential preventative impact and stated this as a central goal 
of the Court’s activities.1
These lofty goals have made it difficult for the ICC to meet 
expectations, and a multitude of concerns and criticisms have 
arisen over the years regarding its ability to make any mean-
ingful contributions to prevention and, perhaps, peace. Some 
argue that the Court is paralyzed by political considerations, 
while others assert that political considerations actually play too 
small a role. At the time of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s 
indictment, many predicted that the ICC’s involvement would 
actually worsen the conflict and lead to a violent backlash. 
Others suggest that the threat of prosecution simply will not 
deter international crimes, and that the Court will only serve to 
delay and hinder peace negotiations.
The idea of justice and punishment as a deterrent to crime has 
been debated and discussed throughout legal history. However, 
applying the theoretical framework of this discussion to mass 
atrocities is not a simple task. Mass atrocities are committed at a 
time when reality is significantly altered and societal norms are 
all but suspended. Whether or not the leader of a nation on the 
brink of genocide may be considered a rational actor who would 
take into account the risk of an ICC indictment is highly debated, 
and with good reason.
While the threat of an indictment itself may not have the 
immediate deterrent effect hoped for in a domestic criminal 
setting, the ICC’s preventative potential goes far beyond the 
debate over deterrence. Individual prosecutions at the interna-
tional level of those most responsible for atrocities are essential 
to the interest of justice and have a great symbolic value for 
the international community as a whole, but the ICC’s great-
est contribution to prevention is not likely to arise from such 
prosecutions. The prosecutions themselves may serve to bring 
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parties to the negotiating table, as in the case of Uganda, but the 
greater impact of the ICC with respect to prevention will be in 
its interaction with domestic systems.
The ICC exists as a model institution, upholding the ideal 
standards for prosecution of international crimes. The ICC will 
undoubtedly have an impact on changing norms and the way we 
think about international criminal law and accountability, simply 
as a result of its existence.2 However, to single-handedly spur a 
sea change in the way we react to and deal with atrocities would 
be nearly impossible. The ICC only has the capacity to provide 
the example, but the cooperation of other international institu-
tions, NGOs, and most importantly States Parties to the Rome 
Statute, is essential to implementing this example more broadly. 
What the ICC can do is take a more active role in engaging these 
groups, in particular States Parties.
Complementarity, a concept that has evolved significantly 
since it was first introduced and ultimately included in the 
Rome Statute,3 presents a way by which the ICC can increase 
its potential positive impact on both domestic and international 
criminal justice and, in the long-term, prevention. By proactively 
engaging with and assisting domestic legal institutions, the ICC 
will be able to strengthen the rule of law in nations suffering 
from violent conflict and instability. Mass atrocities are com-
mitted when reality has been altered such that recognized moral 
imperatives and norms no longer bind members of a society. 
The altered reality of war and conflict creates an environment in 
which crimes such as genocide are more likely to be committed 
with impunity. A society that has, on the other hand, strong legal 
institutions and a strong sense of the rule of law, may be less 
likely to come to this brink.
The first section of this article will focus on complementar-
ity and the emergence of the idea of positive complementarity 
in recent years, and will analyze various provisions of the Rome 
Statute relating to positive complementarity and the ICC’s 
relationship to States Parties and other institutions. The second 
section will discuss in some detail the current policy of the ICC 
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and how some aspects of posi-
tive complementarity have already been implemented. Next, the 
article will address the theoretical underpinnings of prevention 
and how positive complementarity may play a role in deterring 
future crimes by strengthening the rule of law both domestically 
and internationally. Finally, the paper will conclude with a brief 
discussion of the situation in Uganda and the potential impact of 
positive complementarity on such a situation.
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Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo, have suggested that the 
OTP may be able to resolve some of the current issues by inter-
acting more closely and actively with national courts, embracing 
a policy that has come to be called positive complementarity or, 
occasionally, proactive complementarity.13
wHat is Positive comPLementaRity?
Positive complementarity is, generally, the idea that the 
Court, and particularly the OTP and Chief Prosecutor, should 
work to engage national jurisdictions in prosecutions, using 
various methods to encourage states to prosecute cases domesti-
cally whenever possible.14 The ultimate goal of such a policy 
is to strengthen domestic capacity,15 which arguably will have 
a significant positive impact on prevention of future atrocities. 
Positive complementarity suggests that a more active and coop-
erative relationship between States Parties and the ICC is crucial 
to the Court’s success, particularly with respect to its long-term 
preventative impact.
Where traditional complementarity was meant to protect state 
sovereignty and was built on the idea that states would carry out 
national prosecutions as a result of the threat of international 
intervention by the ICC, positive complementarity envisions a 
more cooperative relationship between national jurisdictions and 
the Court.16 While this might mean, most simply, a more proac-
tive “carrot-and-stick” approach, it could also mean that the ICC 
would act to “enhance the ability of states to undertake genuine 
investigations and prosecutions.”17 This activity could encom-
pass anything from communicating with states in which atroci-
ties may be occurring to establishing “legal and judicial training 
and cooperation mechanisms to bolster a weak justice system, 
and then monitor[ing] local judicial processes undertaken for 
crimes that would otherwise fall under ICC jurisdiction.”18
aPPRoacHes to Positive comPLementaRity
The “carrot-and-stick” approach is most similar to the origi-
nal conception of complementarity, based on the idea that the 
threat of ICC intervention will motivate states to conduct their 
own national level prosecutions. The difference with respect to 
positive complementarity is that the OTP would engage more 
directly with States Parties, using diplomatic and other public 
channels to express concern about a particular situation, thus 
encouraging the state to take action.19 This is likely to be most 
effective in cases of states that are unwilling, rather than unable, 
to prosecute. Opening the channels of communication and 
Creating the iCC: the rome Statute  
anD Complementarity
Both the Preamble and Article 1 of the Rome Statute note 
that the jurisdiction of the ICC “shall be complementary to 
national criminal jurisdictions.”4 National courts remain the 
primary venue for trying cases of mass atrocity. Only in par-
ticularly defined circumstances, enumerated in Article 17 of the 
Rome Statute, are cases admissible in the ICC.
At its inception, the idea of complementarity was meant to 
balance the competing interests of those who sought a court 
with universal jurisdiction and those who placed a priority on 
state sovereignty.5 A case is admissible in the ICC only when 
the state with original jurisdiction is “unwilling or unable genu-
inely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”6 In all other 
cases, national courts are meant to retain jurisdiction, not to be 
superseded by the ICC.7
The details of complementary jurisdiction are not explicitly 
described in the Rome Statute. Article 17 provides the frame-
work for understanding complementarity, but lacks detail about 
use of the concept in practice. For the ICC to obtain jurisdiction, 
a state must be either unwilling or unable to genuinely investi-
gate or prosecute.8 The Appeals Chamber has held that, when 
determining admissibility, the Court must first look to whether 
there are ongoing investigations or trials, or whether the state 
conducted such investigations in the past.9 Only if one or both of 
these things have occurred does the Court then look to questions 
of unwillingness or inability.10 If the state with jurisdiction over 
an alleged crime has not attempted to conduct an investigation 
or trial, the case is deemed admissible without consideration of 
willingness or ability.11
evolution of the iCC anD  
poSitive Complementarity
At its inception, the ICC was sad-
dled with a number of tasks and by the 
time the Rome Statute went into force 
in 2002, expectations for the impact the 
ICC might have on the international com-
munity and rule of law were exceptionally 
high.12 As the Court has navigated early 
investigations and cases, the challenges 
to fulfilling these lofty expectations have 
become increasingly clear. To address a 
number of concerns, members of the inter-
national community, including at times 
By proactively engaging with and assisting domestic 
legal institutions, the ICC will be able to strengthen  
the rule of law in nations suffering from violent  
conflict and instability.
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engaging in dialogue with the state regarding the situation could 
spur the state to act.20
Positive complementarity may mean, in certain circum-
stances, working to actively enhance a state’s ability to carry 
out investigations and prosecutions that meet international 
standards.21 This type of approach may be most useful in cases 
in which a state is willing but unable to prosecute. This method 
is likely to be resource-intensive, and given the ICC’s limited 
resources, the OTP will need to look to other States Parties and 
international organizations for assistance. The ICC and the OTP 
could in fact be instrumental in establishing and strengthening 
a transnational network geared towards enforcement of interna-
tional criminal law.22
Positive comPLementaRity anD tHe otP
Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo has recognized the 
importance of complementary domestic prosecution, saying, 
“[A]s a consequence of complementarity, the number of cases 
that reach the Court should not be a measure of its efficiency. 
On the contrary, an absence of trials before this Court, as a 
consequence of the regular functioning of national institutions, 
would be a major success.”23 A 2003 OTP Policy Paper on 
complementarity describes the general rule of complementarity 
as “tak[ing] action only where there is a clear case of failure to 
take national action.” The paper goes on to note that “a major 
part of the external relations and outreach strategy of the Office 
of the Prosecutor will be to encourage and facilitate States 
to carry out their primary responsibility of investigating and 
prosecuting crimes.”24 This indicates that the OTP began early 
on to develop the idea of what has since been deemed positive 
complementarity.25
In its 2006 Policy Paper on Prosecutorial Strategy, the OTP 
notes that it will take a positive approach to complementar-
ity. The paper defines such an approach as meaning that the 
OTP “encourages genuine national proceedings where pos-
sible; relies on national and international networks; and partici-
pates in a system of international cooperation.”26 In a positive 
complementarity model, the Court communicates openly with 
states regarding situations of concern and works to assist those 
states in strengthening their judicial systems in order to carry out 
domestic prosecutions. The OTP recognizes in this paper that the 
support of States Parties as well as “international networks” will 
be crucial to the success of such an approach.
Part of the OTP’s approach to positive complementarity is the 
policy of soliciting self-referrals.27 In a self-referral case,
the Court and a territorial state incapacitated by mass 
crimes may agree that a consensual division of labour 
is the most logical and effective approach. Groups bit-
terly divided by conflict may oppose prosecutions at 
each others’ hands and yet agree to a prosecution by a 
Court perceived as neutral and impartial.28
While the drafters of the Rome Statute likely did not envision 
such a policy, self-referrals present an important tool by which 
to create a partnership between the Court and States Parties, as 
opposed to a competitive relationship.
tHe RoLe of outsiDe institutions
Two main challenges the ICC faces at this point are a lack 
of resources and a lack of credibility, both of which are con-
cerns that may be overcome with the aid of outside institutions. 
Positive complementarity urges the ICC to act in concert with 
States Parties; in order to provide the necessary resources and 
support, the Court will need to work closely with international 
institutions and organizations as well as gain the cooperation of 
States Parties.
The arena of international criminal law remains a develop-
ing field,29 and the participation of States Parties is crucial to 
its evolution. As commentators have noted, “Where a state acts 
in such a situation of legal vulnerability its dual role as subject 
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and creator of international law becomes most visible. As such, 
states in transition apply existing law and, in so doing, contribute 
to its refinement.”30 States are more likely to rely on and follow 
the ICC if it is viewed not as an institution operating on its own, 
but as a part of the international community that supports a body 
of accepted international norms.
Lack of Resources
With respect to positive complementarity, the more ambitious 
goal of actually assisting domestic systems with capacity build-
ing seems to only exacerbate the problem of lack of resources.31 
In order to truly make progress with respect to positive comple-
mentarity, the ICC, and at this stage specifically the OTP, must 
seek assistance and support from States Parties as well as NGOs 
and the international community. As mentioned above, the ICC 
could serve to facilitate a transnational network of organizations 
working in the area of international criminal law. Dozens of 
NGOs focus on rule of law and transitional justice. By working 
in coordination with such groups, the ICC can help NGOs to 
focus their work where it is most needed and draw international 
attention to conflicts that might otherwise be overlooked. This 
will draw resources and support to situations that need attention 
but which the ICC may not be able to address without assistance.
The OTP has already indicated that it recognizes the value 
of relationships with outside institutions. The 2006 Report 
on Prosecutorial Strategy notes that “the Office will continue 
expanding its network of contacts with non-States Parties, 
international organisations and NGOs aimed at fostering a sup-
portive environment.” The report also mentions solidifying the 
Court’s relationship with the UN and crafting a specific plan of 
outreach to regional organizations such as the European Union 
and the African Union.32 The 2006 Report on Prosecutorial 
Strategy lists as its Fifth Objective the goal of establishing 
“forms of cooperation with states and organizations to maximize 
the Office’s contribution to the fight against impunity and the 
prevention of crimes.”33
Cooperation with other institutions will be crucial to the 
ICC’s success, particularly with respect to resource-intensive 
assistance to national judicial systems. By engaging States 
Parties through positive complementarity, the OTP may expect 
and encourage states to draw upon their own resources and 
those of supporting NGOs in the region in order to comply with 
international standards and OTP requests and suggestions. The 
support of NGOs and other institutions will not only provide 
additional resources, but may also lend much-needed credibility 
to the ICC’s and the OTP’s actions.34 It is from NGOs and States 
Parties that the Prosecutor will receive the support necessary 
to legitimate his actions and thus enhance the credibility of the 
Court.35
Credibility and National Prosecutions
A consistent criticism of the ICC is a lack of credibility 
stemming from multiple issues. As noted above, one approach 
to addressing some of this criticism is to enlist the support of 
States Parties and other institutions in order to more concretely 
establish both the place of the ICC in international law, as well 
as enforcement of international criminal law in general. Another 
credibility concern relates to the fact that trials in international 
courts and tribunals have been criticized as being too far-
removed from the conflict itself, both geographically and ideo-
logically. States have different approaches to justice, and some 
critics of the ICC note that it may not be able to take into account 
such differences, weakening its credibility in their eyes and the 
eyes of both perpetrators and victims in some states.36
On an immediate level, national courts are in many ways 
the most efficient and effective venue for trying cases of mass 
atrocity that have occurred within a state’s territory. The benefits 
range from practical — access to evidence and witnesses — to 
more abstract — trying perpetrators in the affected state may 
be a more effective transitional justice method, as the trials are 
closer to the victims and others affected by the crimes in ques-
tion, thus providing a greater connection for states and citizens 
working towards peace and reconciliation.37 Adopting a positive 
approach to complementarity and thus encouraging domestic tri-
als could undercut the criticism that the Court is too far-removed 
for effective prosecution and prevention.
poSitive Complementarity anD prevention
By encouraging national courts to establish systems by 
which to try international crimes as defined in the Rome Statute, 
the ICC is making an essential contribution to the prevention of 
atrocities. Positive complementarity encourages states to build 
and strengthen their domestic judicial systems. A state with 
strong judicial institutions and respect for the rule of law is argu-
ably less likely to reach the level of societal upheaval in which 
international crimes are most often committed.
DeteRRence anD PRevention in an inteRnationaL setting
The concept of prevention in the context of mass atrocities is 
necessarily different from the idea of deterrence in a domestic 
setting. The value of punishment as a deterrent is debated even 
at the national level, with frequent disagreement over issues 
such as whether certainty or severity of punishment has a greater 
impact on deterrence.38 When applying this type of theory 
to international crimes such as genocide and crimes against 
humanity, one must also take into account the specific situations 
in which such crimes occur.
Mass atrocities occur at times when normal societal order has 
broken down: as one scholar writes, “[C]ivil conflict is, by defi-
nition, coterminous with the collapse of public order.”39 Given 
that the norms of daily life have all but disappeared in such situ-
ations, the arguments for deterrence with respect to individual 
crimes such as theft or even murder necessarily shift.
Traditional notions of deterrence are based on the idea that 
the prospect of punishment will prevent an individual from 
taking unlawful action. Deterrence theory falls into two catego-
ries: general and specific deterrence, with specific deterrence 
focusing on the individual and general deterrence on preventing 
crime in society at large.40 A main criticism of the ICC is that 
the assumption that potential perpetrators involved in an armed 
conflict are weighing the consequences of their actions and may 
be deterred by the threat of prosecution seems less than likely. 
In other words, “the assumption of perpetrator rationality in the 
4
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chaos of massive violence, incendiary propaganda, and upended 
social order” is something of a leap.41
While individual prosecutions are not without merit since 
they may in certain cases (such as Uganda) spur negotiations 
and serve as an important tool for establishing much-needed 
precedent, the ICC may have the greatest ability to prevent on 
a larger scale through its impact on national judicial systems.
By adopting a strategy of positive complementarity and 
using both increased pressure and communication between the 
ICC and States Parties, as well as facilitating ICC-supported 
transnational networks dedicated to international criminal law, 
the OTP together with the ICC as a whole can foster greater 
respect for the rule of law both domestically and internation-
ally. Strong judicial institutions will stabilize societies, fostering 
respect for both judicial and governmental structures, which 
may strengthen a democratic form of government. This in turn 
will reduce the likelihood that such atrocities will occur down 
the road, as it is arguably less likely that society will again reach 
such a point of collapse. As Diane Orentlicher notes, “[B]y dem-
onstrating that no sector is above the law, prosecutions of state 
crimes can foster respect for democratic institutions and thereby 
deepen a society’s democratic culture.”42
Experts suggest there are “conditions precedent to mass vio-
lence” such as “the silence of the majority, the acquiescence of 
the bystander, and the complicity of those neighbors who avert 
their gaze.”43 By working with various international bodies — 
from the UN to NGOs to other States Parties — the OTP and 
the ICC as a whole may be able to make these conditions more 
and more difficult to create. Drawing international attention to 
a situation could inspire neighboring states to apply diplomatic 
pressure or encourage individuals to speak up about certain vio-
lations that they might otherwise have ignored.
Were the OTP to implement a policy of positive comple-
mentarity, thus engaging with states and drawing the attention 
of both States Parties and outside organizations to specific 
situations and crises, this could actually “turn some erstwhile 
bystanders into gatekeepers.”44 These bystanders may act to pre-
vent atrocity not because they themselves fear prosecution, but 
because of a moral imperative to act. In the long term, this urge 
could be strengthened if the ICC were to support and pressure 
States Parties to follow through with prevention and prosecution 
of grave international crimes, helping to create stronger institu-
tions and in the long run strengthening the rule of law.
Thus, the ICC’s greatest contribution may not be an indi-
vidual prosecution:
[T]he critical moment may not come when the Court 
first begins to investigate and pursue charges. Instead, 
it may come later, after which the ICC’s work may 
already have helped to stigmatize the wrongdoers, 
draw international attention to a difficult situation, and 
catalyze increased political pressure that is conducive 
to negotiation.45
This in turn could spur the state to act, to seek assistance 
from organizations working on rule of law issues, and to 
work closely with an ICC that embraces the notion of positive 
complementarity.
the example of uganDa
The ICC is only in its early stages of operation, and the emer-
gence of positive complementarity as a policy choice for the 
OTP is younger still. Given the short time the policy has been in 
place, it is difficult to measure its effectiveness. It will be nearly 
impossible to determine when an atrocity has been prevented, 
as there will be little evidence of an event that has not occurred. 
The case of Uganda, however, provides an example of early 
benefits associated with a positive complementarity approach.
In December 2003, Ugandan President Museveni requested 
that the ICC investigate and prosecute the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA) for serious violations of international law, and 
in January 2004, Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo officially 
opened an investigation in the region.46 The LRA had been oper-
ating in northern Uganda since the late 1980s. Led by Joseph 
Kony, the rebel group originally claimed to be fighting for greater 
political power for northern Uganda and generally in protest of 
the government’s alleged ill-treatment of northern Ugandans. 
The LRA has also claimed religious motivations, including the 
goal of implementing as law the Ten Commandments. In the 
early 1990s, the LRA began to focus their attacks on civilians 
in northern Uganda in order to eliminate those who supposedly 
supported the government over the LRA.47
After years of failed peace negotiations,48 President Museveni 
referred the case to the ICC in 2004. This was the first situation 
of self-referral to the Court,49 representing an early success of 
the Prosecutor’s policy encouraging self-referrals in lieu of using 
his proprio motu powers.50 Article 15 of the Rome Statute gives 
the Prosecutor the power to “initiate investigations proprio motu 
on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court.” Thus, proprio motu powers allow the Prosecutor to 
act on his own volition, as opposed to waiting for a State Party 
or the Security Council to refer a situation to the Court.51
Throughout the peace process, observers have suggested that 
ICC involvement has served to bring the LRA to the negotiating 
table when the rebel group might not otherwise have done so.52 
The positive involvement and encouragement of the ICC has 
thus contributed to the progress of difficult peace negotiations. 
Although a peace agreement has yet to be signed, the violence 
has decreased in Northern Uganda since the ICC referral.53
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EnDnotEs: Prevention and Complementarity in the International Criminal Court
As a result of ICC involvement and demands from LRA 
leaders in negotiations that they not be prosecuted abroad, the 
Government of Uganda has begun to implement a method by 
which to try domestically the international crimes enumerated in 
the Rome Statute.54 The process thus far has engaged a signifi-
cant number of government and civil society leaders. Based on 
the involvement of these leaders as well as concerted outreach 
efforts within the local legal communities and particularly with 
leaders in Gulu, the creation of these institutions may contribute 
to greater respect for the institution and trials that result. The 
envisioned war crimes division of the Ugandan High Court will 
be the product of a collaborative process between local leaders 
and international advisors, and ideally will reflect both Ugandan 
and international standards and incorporate traditional justice 
mechanisms. Indeed, Uganda is so highly engaged with the pro-
cess that Kampala was selected to be the site of the ICC Review 
Conference from May to June 2010.55
The full impact these activities will have on Uganda in the 
future remains to be seen. The OTP’s policy of active engage-
ment with States Parties and the new approach of positive 
complementarity seem to have played a role in moving Uganda 
forward in its peace process, and in both expanding the judicial 
system and engaging various parts of society in the process. If 
the war crimes division does succeed, it will likely face many 
challenges and criticisms, but the fact of its existence will be a 
positive development, much like the existence of the ICC, and 
the new division’s existence over time may strengthen respect for 
the rule of law in Uganda.
The emerging field of international criminal law remains in 
its nascent stages. States such as Uganda and institutions such as 
the ICC have the potential to move the field forward and further 
clarify and establish both domestic and international norms and 
standards. Uganda’s war crimes division and the discussions and 
interest in rule of law that its establishment inspires may be the 
first step toward a more stable judicial system, and ultimately, 
a more stable government in a country that has struggled with 
violence, corruption, and instability since independence.
ConCluSion
Prevention of atrocities is a simultaneously much debated and 
highly championed part of the ICC’s mandate. Not only is pre-
vention a debated issue, it also proves nearly impossible to mea-
sure. While the Court’s existence and operation will serve as an 
example and help to create necessary standards in the developing 
field of international criminal law, perhaps the most direct con-
tribution it can make towards prevention is through engagement 
with States Parties to strengthen domestic judicial institutions.
Article 17 of the Rome Statute allows the ICC, and the OTP 
in particular, the flexibility necessary to adopt a policy of posi-
tive complementarity, working to encourage and support states to 
pursue domestic prosecutions. States Parties may take ownership 
of the process and tailor it to the needs of a particular situation, 
which in the long run may lead to a more lasting peace and 
stronger rule of law.
By working with states to strengthen their domestic institu-
tions, the ICC can foster respect for the rule of law and gov-
ernmental institutions, creating a more stable society which in 
turn would be less likely to fall into mass violence in the future. 
Through cooperation with other institutions and NGOs, the ICC 
may be able to provide the support necessary to states seeking 
assistance. While individual prosecutions are valuable in what 
they represent, and the model they set forth, the long-term impact 
of the ICC on prevention will likely be seen most clearly in its 
interaction with domestic jurisdictions.  HRB
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